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DOMESTIC RELATIONS -ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS WAIVING ALIMONY ARE
NOT VOID PER SE. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552,471 A.2d 705 (1984).
After eight years of marriage, a wife sued her husband for divorce
a mensa et thoro, 1 child support, and other relief. Her husband raised
preliminary objections to the request for alimony based on an antenuptial agreement waiving all claims for alimony or support. 2 The trial
court, relying on Maryland decisional law, declared the antenuptial
agreement null and void as against public policy and awarded the wife
alimony pendente lz~e and child support. 3 On appeal, 4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Frey v. Frey 5 held that antenuptial agreements
waiving alimony are no longer void ab im~io as contrary to public
policy. 6
Common law favored agreements made in contemplation of marriage.7 These agreements are considered contracts and thus must comport with the general contract principles of fairness and consideration. 8
Moreover, the state, because of the special nature of these contracts,
I. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984). Divo;ce a mensa et thoro is a

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

partial divorce that terminates cohabitation, but does not otherwise affect the legal
marital status. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 431 (5th ed. 1979). Divorce a
vinculo matrimonii completely dissolves the marriage bond. ld
Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 554, 471 A.2d 705, 706 (1984). As to the issue of
maintenance the agreement provides in pertinent part:
That in the event of any separation by the parties for any reason, the
parties hereto agree that they shall release and waive any claims for alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony, or support or maintenance of
any other type and description, as the result of such separation, or as the
result of any differences between the parties.
Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 5, Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705
(1984).
Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 555, 471 A.2d 705, 706 (1984). Alimony pendente lite is
a temporary provision of support made pending a suit for divorce. See BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 67 (5th ed. 1979).
The husband appealed and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted his writ of
certiorari, prior to consideration by the court of special appeals because of the
important public policy issue. The court of appeals first disposed of the jurisdictional issue by noting appealability under Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN.
§ 12-303(c)(5) (1984), which permits an appeal from an interlocutory circuit court
order for the payment of money. Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 555, 471 A.2d 705,
707 (1984).
298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984).
ld at 563, 471 A.2d at 710. The court of appeals remanded the proceeding to the
trial court for a factual determination as to the validity of the agreement.
C. VERNIER, AMERICAN fAMILY LAWS 51 (Vol. III 1935). As early as 1866,
Maryland courts recognized the lawfulness of antenuptial agreements. For example, in Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532 (1866), the court of appeals enforced an antenuptial contract barring the wife's dower rights since she entered into it in good
faith, and with a full and clear understanding of its purpose. See also Schnepfe v.
Schnepfe, 124 Md. 330, 92 A. 891 (1914) (enforcing antenuptial agreement providing for cash payment in lieu of dower despite wife's abandonment of her husband); Busey Ex'r. v. McCurley, 61 Md. 436 (1883) (enforcing antenuptial
agreement where wife waived her dower rights in exchange for a house).
H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 27 (1968).
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requires additional safeguards before it will enforce the agreement.
For example, to protect the public interest in preserving the marital
relationship, the state is considered a third party to every marital contract.9 In this role the state defines the marital relationship, the J'rocedures for dissolution, and the attending duties and benefits. 1 The
courts will not enforce private contracts that interfere with targeted areas of state interest, such as spousal and child support. 11 Also, since the
special relationship of those engaged to be married is ill served by the
arm's length standard of commercial contracts, 12 some courts have consistently applied a higher standard of review when determining the validity of marriage contracts. 13 In effect, this approach reflects an
attempt to strike a balance between the state's interest in preserving
marriage and the citizens' right to contract freely. 14
Historically, antenuptial agreements defining property distribution
and rights to support upon divorce implicated two areas of state concern. First, the state had an interest in preserving marriage because it
was considered the foundation of society. The moral, economic, and
social well-being of the citizenry was seen as directly dependent upon
the stability of the family. 15 Thus, antenuptial agreements inducing
separation or divorce were void as against public policy 16 even if the
9. Comment, The Modem Theory and Practice ofAntenuptial Agreements, 5 J. MAR.
J. PRAc. & PRoc. 179, 179-80 (1971). But if. Weitzman, Legal Regulation ofMarriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169 (1974) (in view of changing
societal and individual needs the state's interest is no longer significant enough to
justify its interference in the private marital relationship).
10. See Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to -08 (1984) (Marital Property Act); Mo. FAM. LAw. CooE ANN.§§ 7-101 to -105, 8-101 to -103, 11-101 toIll (1984) (alimony provisions).
II. H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 28-29, citing Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165
P.2d 209 (1946); Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 A. 914 (1935); Franch v.
McAnamey, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.
App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis. 2d 146, 92 N.W.2d
356 (1958); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
12. For a discussion of one court's application of the commercial conscionability standard to an antenuptial contract, see Note, Antenuptial Contracts Contingent Upon
Divorce are Not Invalid Per Se: Ferry v. Ferry, 46 Mo. L. REv. 228 (1981).
13. Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600
(1973); see also Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
14. Comment, supra note 9, at 179.
15. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
16. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 1973) (antenuptial
agreements are void ab initio, not just on the facts of each case); Cohn v. Cohn,
209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 ( 1956) (where the amount of the award upon divorce
was directly related to the length of the marriage, the court likened it to "severance pay" rather than an equitable settlement of property rights); Duncan v.
Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (provision limiting spouse's liability for alimony is conducive to divorce); if. Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 320
N.E.2d 506 (1974) (invalidated agreement that waived alimony if either party
sought a divorce within seven years of the marriage); Norris v. Norris, 174
N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970) (innocent party will have to endure conduct which would
constitute grounds for divorce because an agreement made inadequate provision
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agreements were otherwise valid. 17 Substantial changes in the public's
attitude toward marriage and divorce, however, have weakened this interest. The state has no interest in preserving failed marriages, as evidenced by the liberalized divorce laws in many states. 18 Further, the
traditional roles of husband and wife are no longer rigidly defined.
The new economic and social equality between the spouses and increased participation of women in the economy mitigate the need for
the court's continued patemalism. 19 Indeed, many courts now suggest
that antenuptial agreements may actually promote marital stability. 20
The second area of state interest implicated was spousal support.
Specifically, the state wanted to prevent its citizens from becoming
wards of the state and thereby a drain on the public coffers. 21 Indeed,
the state interest was so strong that support is considered an essential of
marriage. 22 States thus prohibited agreements regulating support because the duty of spousal support was defined by law and could not be
altered by contract. 23 Agreements regulating property, however, were
allowed because, unlike support, property was not considered an essential of marriage. 24
In Cohn v. Cohn, 25 the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized
the state's interest in preserving marriage and supporting its citizens. 26
In Cohn, the court ruled that antenuptial agreements barring alimony

17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.

for support). But see H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 28 (agreement providing inducement for one party to seek divorce will often have the. opposite effect on the other
party).
Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1263 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 586
(1932)).
Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1264. One court interpreted the statutory change as
legislative support of amicable settlement of disputes within marriage. Newman
v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731 (Colo. 1982).
Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1266-68; see, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App.
131,531 P.2d 176 (1975); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331,352 N.E.2d
785 (1976).
See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Newman v.
Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17
(Fla. 1962); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Buettner v.
Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506
P.2d 719 (1973); Schutterle v. Schutterle, 260 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977).
Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1260.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 190 comment a (1979).
Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill.
App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331,
352 N.E.2d 785 (1976); In re Marriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa
1973); Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1977); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C.
190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124,42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956).
ld at 475, 121 A.2d at 706. The court found the Cohn agreement, though executed with full disclosure of the husband's assets, to have directly induced the
husband's desertion of his wife. The agreement provided for a lump sum award
to the wife in lieu of property and support. The amount of the award was determined by the number of years of marriage: the longer the marriage the larger the
award. The husband deserted his wife just days before a scheduled increase. The
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were per se invalid. 27 Maryland followed the Cohn rule for twentyeight years until it was expressly renounced in Frey v. Frey 28 as no
longer responsive to the public interest. 29 In doing so Maryland joined
the majority of jurisdictions, which have abandoned the absolute prohibition of these agreements in favor of a case by case approach. 30
The case by case approach in antenuptial cases evolved from the
changes in marital roles and the public attitude toward marriage and
divorce. 31 The Cohn decision was based on the preservation of marriage32 and support of spouses, 33 but subsequent increased public interest in dissolving failed marriages has since prompted states to enact
more liberal divorce laws. 34 By implication, this has severely weakened
the state's interest in preserving marriage. Furthermore, in questioning
whether antenuptial agreements induce divorce, some states have concluded that these agreements actually encourage marital stability by
permitting advance determination of the parties' respective property interests.35 Thus, the state's interest in preserving marriage is no longer a
basis for a per se prohibition of these agreements.
It is not as easy to dispose of the state's interest in spousal support,
particularly upon separation or divorce.3 6 At the very least the state is
concerned that its citizens shall not become public wards. 37 This interest, coupled with the special relationship of the parties, has prompted a
compromise between freedom of contract principles and the absolute
prohibition rule. The modem trend jurisdictions have developed a new
approach holding that the agreements are not void per se, but they will
be closely scrutinized for fraud, overreaching and unconscionability,
1984)

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

court thus concluded that the terms of the agreement induced his desertion. /d. at
477, 121 A.2d at 707.
/d. at 477, 121 A.2d at 707.
298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984).
/d. at 558, 471 A.2d at 708.
See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Singer v. Singer, 318 So. 2d 438 (Fla.
1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Unander v.
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973).
See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Newman v.
Newman, 653 P.Jd 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp.
44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v.
Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind.
App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719
(1973).
See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1264; see also MD. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 7-103
(1984).
See supra note 20.
Comment, For Better Or For Worse . . . . But Just In Case, Are Antenuptial
Agreements Enforceable?, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 531. Only four jurisdictions lack
alimony or spousal support statutes. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1185 n.77.
One commentator has argued that this is the extent of the state's interest. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 1244.
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and may be invalidated on that basis. 38
Courts thus subject support contracts to close scrutiny. The various tests developed by the courts for this purpose have emphasized
three general areas of concern: whether the agreement was validly procured; whether the agreement was fair in result; and determining which
party has the burden of proving the validity of the agreement.
In determining valid procurement, the presence of fraud, duress,
or misrepresentation can invalidate an antenuptial agreement. 39 The
agreement must be executed voluntarily, with knowledge of its content
and legal effect.40 The use of independent legal counsel, though not
required, is. probative of validity. 41 Most importantly, many courts
have required either actual knowledge or some degree of disclosure of
financial worth. 42
The adequacy4 3 of the agreement's provisions is considered under
the second area of concern: fairness in result. Since this element most
38. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp ..44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 419 A.2d 1085
(D.C. 1980); Singer v. Singer, 318 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1975); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d
629 (1978); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Ferry v.
Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505
P.2d 600 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); Unander v.
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). Some courts have held that parties
may contract but the court has ultimate authority as to whether to enforce the
agreement. See, e.g., Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846 (1975);
Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978); Schutterle v. Schutterle, 260
N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977). Contra In reMarriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586
(Iowa 1973); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); Mulford v. Mulford,
211 Neb. 747, 320 N.W.2d 470 (1982); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.
App. 1983).
39. See, e.g., Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Volid v.
Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.W.2d 42 (1972); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass.
591,428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Posner v.
Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d
629 (1978); if. Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 A.2d 145 (1955) (property agreement invalid since the wife did not understand it).
41. See, e.g., Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Matlock v.
Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978); Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116
A.2d 145 (1955).
42. See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); Belcher v.
Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan.
679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978); Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969); if.
Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 A.2d 145 (1955) (agreement invalid since the
husband made no disclosure to his wife before she executed a property settlement
agreement). But if. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (court
devised two-pronged test: full disclosure or actual knowledge required only if the
provision is inadequate). The same test was applied in Schutterle v. Schutterle,
260 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1977). See also Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865
(1967) (unfairly disproportionate provision in the absence of disclosure or actual
knowledge places burden of proving that the agreement was knowingly and voluntarily made on the party seeking to enforce it).
43. Courts also refer to adequacy as conscionability, fairness or reasonableness. See,
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directly affects the state's interest in spousal support, courts scrutinize it
with a view toward protecting this interest. Toward this end, courts
have used four different approaches. 44 The first approach, which measures the adequacy of the provision at the time the contract was executed, will validate the agreement if it was fair at the time it was
made. 45 The second approach requires that the provision be adequate
at both the time of execution and enforcement. 46 The third approach
measures adequacy only at the time of enforcement, finding unconscionability when enforcement results in insufficient financial means for the
spouse. 47 The fourth approach measures adequacy at the time of execution, but permits modification at the time of enforcement. 48
The third area of concern is allocating the burden of proving the
validity of the agreement. Courts have used several different approaches with no clear trend evolving. One court has allocated the burden to the husband, under the clear and convincing standard of
proof. 49 Another court has held that there is a presumption of validity
unless circumstances show otherwise. 50 Another court has developed a
e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio,
143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
44. See Note, supra note 12, at 235 n.33.
45. See Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975); accordVolid v.
Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972) (court stated that it would construe, not make, contracts); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 629
(1978) (court enforced agreement that waived alimony because there was full disclosure and the wife understood the agreement and had participated in the negotiations); if. Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969) (court enforced
property agreement, noting that the wife had actual knowledge of her husband's
financial affairs).
46. See Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Under this
agreement the wife received $200,000 in lieu of alimony. The parties had met one
month before the wedding and the marriage lasted 16 months. The court found
the agreement fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
47. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734 (Colo. 1982); see also Unander v.
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973) (antenuptial agreement should be enforced unless it deprives a spouse of needed support not otherwise obtainable).
48. Courts using this method have applied different standards for allowing modification. In 1962, the Supreme Court of Florida developed a fairness test under which
a provision was considered fair if it enabled the dependent spouse to maintain a
similar standard of living as in marriage. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d
17, 20 (Fla. 1962). Later, in Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1972), the
same court, in accordance with state law, permitted modification for a change in
circumstances, which it noted was the same standard used for modifying postnuptial agreements. Other courts have held that the issue of support is a matter
for judicial determination and, therefore, even a valid antenuptial agreement is
subject to judicial review. Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810,
816 (1981); if. Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976)
(valid antenuptial agreement just one factor used in considering an award for
support); Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846 (1975) (court not
bound to accept terms of valid antenuptial agreement).
49. Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975).
50. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976);
Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846 (1975).
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rule that interrelates the requirements of disclosure and adequacy. It
held that while ordinarily the burden is on the party alleging invalidity,
if the provision is facially unreasonable, a presumption of concealment
arises that shifts the burden to the other party. 51
Prior to Frey, Maryland courts were not concerned with proving
the validity of antenuptial agreements affecting support because the
agreements were per se invalid. Levy v. Sherman, 52 a 1945 decision by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, established a standard to determine
the validity of antenuptial agreements affecting property rights. The
Levy court first noted that the parties to an antenuptial agreement have
a confidential relationship, imposing a duty on each to make a frank,
full, and truthful disclosure. Then it applied a two-pronged test: if the
disclosure is inadequate and the provision in the agreement is unfairly
disproportionate to the other's financial worth, an implication of fraud
arises placing a burden on the one seeking enforcement to show that it
was knowingly and voluntarily executed, with the opportunity to obtain independent legal advice. 53
Twenty-two years later, the court of appeals applied the Levy test
in Hartz v. Hartz. 54 The Hartz court enforced an antenuptial agreement that preserved the premarital property interests of the husband
and wife. Further, the court delineated the factors for testing agreements in the absence of adequate disclosure or knowledge. First, the
agreement must be fair and equitable under the circumstances. 55 This
is determined by comparing the benefit gained with the rights relinquished, measured at the time the agreement was formed. Second, the
repudiator must have executed it freely and understandingly. 56 If these
two requirements are met, disclosure or knowledge is not necessary,
even though the parties have a confidential relationship. 57
In Frey v. Frey, 5 8 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed this
issue for the first time since Cohn v. Cohn. 59 Expressly overruling
Cohn, the Frey court held that antenuptial agreements waiving alimony
51. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962); accord Posner v.
Posner, 257 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1972) (where the provision for the wife was
disproportionate to the husband's wealth at the time of making the agreement, the
burden shifted to the husband).
52. 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945).
53. Id at 73-74, 43 A.2d at 29. The court found the agreement valid and enforced it.
54. 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 ( 1967). The wife, who had a great deal of financial and
business acumen, initiated and negotiated the agreement to protect her own estate.
The agreement was later similarly altered to protect the husband's estate. The
parties thereafter executed the agreement. Therefore, there was no doubt that the
wife fully understood the terms and effect of the agreement, and that she signed it
voluntarily. Id at 50-54, 234 A.2d at 867-70.
55. Id at 58, 234 A.2d at 871-72.
56. Id
57. Id
58. 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984).
59. 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956).
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are not void per seas contrary to public policy. 60 The court adopted the
majority trend's view that public policy concerning marriage and divorce has changed since its decision in Cohn. 61 The court noted that
divorce has become commonplace62 and that the state has no interest in
preserving a marriage that has deteriorated beyond reconciliation. 63 In
addition, the state's interest in spousal support is no longer advanced
by the traditional view of the husband as provider and the wife as
homemaker. The expanding employment opportunities for women
have moderated the husband's duty of support. 64 In view of these social changes, the court abandoned the Cohn prohibition as not responsive to current public interests. Rather, the court reasoned that these
interests can be better served by independently evaluating the validity
of each agreement. 65
The Frey court found legislative expression to support its decision
in Maryland's Marital Property Act. 66 This statute concerns property
distribution in divorce proceedings and permits the exclusion of marital
property and family use personal property by valid agreement of the
parties. The court thus reasoned that antenuptial agreements are favored in law, and should be enforced if valid. 67 A dissent, however,
argued that the Marital Property Act68 does not enunciate public policy
concerning alimony, but instead merely codifies earlier decisional law
that validated agreements disposing of property. 69
In Frey, the court of appeals adopted a flexible approach to determine the validity of antenuptial agreements by replacing the absolute
prohibition with a case by case determination. 70 The validity of an
agreement is determined by an application of the Hartz test/ 1 which
required either disclosure or a fair agreement voluntarily and understandingly made. The Frey court, however, has expanded the scope of
this test in several respects.
First, the Frey court's language indicates that all the Hartz factors
are mandatory. 72 This is in direct contradiction of the two-pronged ap60.
61.
62.
63.

Frey, 298 Md. at 558, 471 A.2d at 708.
Id. at 561, 471 A.2d at 710.
/d. at 560, 471 A.2d at 709.
/d. This is evidenced by a state law that provides for voluntary separation and
divorce. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 7-103(a)(3) (1984).
64. Frey, 298 Md. at 560, 471 A.2d at 709 (quoting Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386,
391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46-47 (1972)).
65. Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 711.
66. Id. at 562-63, 471 A.2d at 710 (construing Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CooE ANN.
§ 3-6A-01(c), (e) (1984)).
67. Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 710.
68. MD. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CoDE ANN.§ 3-6A-01 to -08 (1984).
69. Frey, 298 Md. at 565,471 A.2d at 711-12 (Smith, J., dissenting).
70./d. at563,471 A.2dat71l.
71. /d. at 564,471 A.2d at 711.
72. /d. at 564-65, 471 A.2d at 711. The court listed the factors:
The agreement must be fair and equitable in procurement and result.
The parties must make frank, full, and truthful disclosure of all their
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proach of Hartz, which waived the disclosure requirement in the face
of a fair provision. 73 Second, one factor requires that the agreement be
fair and equitable in result. 74 Result can be measured as of the time of
contract formation, as in Hartz, 75 or at the time of contract effect,
which is at separation or divorce. Although the court's language is
somewhat ambiguous, the latter approach is more consistent with the
common usage of the word "result." 76 Thus, it is arguable that the Frey
court did not intend a strict application of the Hartz factors. Rather,
expressly following the Hartz lead, the Frey court has developed a preferable, albeit slightly different approach for testing the validity of
agreements affecting support. Since neither support needs nor the ability to pay support can be determined in advance, the fairness of a support provision before marriage is irrelevant. Accordingly, measuring
the adequacy of the provision at the time of its application is a more
analytically sound approach, and is more responsive to the state's interest in the adequate support of its citizens.
Despite the improvements in Maryland law, Frey presents several
problems. First, one of the reasons support needs are unforeseeable is
that family needs constantly change. In response to this fluctuating
economic variable, support provisions must be subject to modification.
Currently, Maryland law does not permit the modification of antenuptial agreements, although a court does have discretion to alter alimony
provisions in both separation agreements and divorce decrees. 77 The
General Assembly needs to resolve this issue to protect the state's interest in spousal support.
Second, the Frey court left unanswered the question of which
party has the burden of proving the validity of the agreement. The
court of appeals has stated that a confidential relationship exists between the parties, but did not explain the effect of this relationship.
The question is further confused in light of recent decisions by the
court of special appeals that have abrogated the presumption of a confidential relationship between spouses. 78 Whether the Frey court in-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

assets. The agreement must be 'entered into voluntarily, freely, and with
full knowledge of its meaning and effect.' Further, we have emphasized
the importance of independent legal advice in evaluating whether the
agreement was voluntarily and understandingly made. Also, in evaluating the disclosure and procurement of the agreement, the trial judge
must remember that the parties stand in a confidential relationship.
Id. (citing Hartz, 248 Md. at 56, 234 A.2d at 870 (emphasis supplied)).
Hartz, 248 Md. at 58, 234 A.2d at 871-72; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying
text.
Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d at 711.
Hartz, 248 Md. at 57, 234 A.2d at 871.
"Result" means "a consequence, effect, issue or conclusion." WEBSTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1937 (1976).
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 8-103, l1-107(b) (1984).
Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10, 13, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (1977), cert. denied, 282 Md.
729 (1978). A confidential relationship exists when the relationship between the
parties is such that the wife would assume that her husband would only act con-
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tended to advocate the presumption in the antenuptial context is
unclear, but it is inconsistent to presume a confidential relationship between unmarried persons and deny it as between a husband and wife.
Third, the Frey court's reliance on the Maryland Marital Property
Act as a definitive expression of legislative intent to validate antenuptial agreements is misplaced. While the Marital Property Act is the
appropriate vehicle for interpreting agreements concerning property, it
is irrelevant in the alimony context. 79
Fourth, the court of appeals in Frey has shown a willingness to
refashion an outmoded rule in accordance with current public interests. 80 The result in Frey is consistent with the court's perception of the
changes in societal perceptions concerning divorce, and the court was
correct in its decision to eliminate the absolute bar to antenuptial
agreements contemplating divorce. By requiring full disclosure in
every agreement and that fairness be measured at the time of separation or divorce, the Frey court has correctly mandated a stricter validity
test for agreements effecting support. Further, since support needs cannot be accurately foreseen, measuring the fairness of the provision at
the time of its effect is more apt to result in adequate support and,
therefore, is more responsive to the state's interest in spousal support.
Once a means of modifying these agreements is provided, the new approach will prove to be an equitable balance between individual and
state interests.
Kathryn Lego Armiger

sistently with her welfare. McClellan v. McClellan, 52 Md. App. 525, 531, 451
A.2d 334, 338 (1982). When a confidential relationship exists the burden shifts to
the husband to prove that the agreement was fair. Absent proof of a confidential
relationship, a separation agreement is presumed valid. Id. at 531, 451 A.2d at
338-39 (citing Cronin v. Hebditch, 195 Md. 607, 74 A.2d 50 (1950)).
79. Frey, 298 Md. at 565, 471 A.2d at 711-12 (Smith, J., dissenting).
80. That the court has the power and authority to do so is well-established. I d. at 562,
471 A.2d at 707-08 (citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983)).

